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CASE COMMENTS

federal inquiry upon grounds of unconstitutionality would be uncertain and troublesome, to say nothing of the refusal of the federal
courts to extend comity to the states' determinations of what constituted illegally seized evidence. Therefore, he does not believe that
conflict between the federal courts and the state courts following the
exclusionary rule will be reduced.
Nevertheless, 'by the Elkins decision, the pendulum 'has made a
further movement away from the common law practice and in the
direction of more civil rights for citizens under a constitutional
government.
Esdel Beane Yost

Constitutional Law-Navigable WatersExtension of the Federal Prerogative
A state agency 'built and operated a hydroelectric power
project in Oklahoma on the nonnavigable Grand River, a tributary
of the Arkansas. Subsequently, the federal government, as part of
a comprehensive plan for power production, flood control, and regulation of navigation on the navigable Arkansas River, constructed
another project on the nonnavigable -tributary at a location for which
the state agency 'held a franchise. The agency demanded compensation for the "taking" of its water power rights and its franchise to
develop electric power at that site. The Court of Claims held the
government liable. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the
judgment, holding that, when the United States asserts its superior
authority under the commerce clause to regulate the water flow of
a navigable stream, there is no "taking" of "property" in the meaning
of the fifth amendment, and, further, that under the commerce power
Congress can treat watersheds as a key to flood control on navigable
streams and their tributaries, and the power of flood control extends
to the nonnavigable tributaries of navigable streams. United States
v. Grand River Dam Authority, 80 S. Ct. 1134 (1960).
The expansion of the navigable stream concept, considered a
progressive liberalization of the commerce clause by many legal
scholars and a malignancy by others, has achieved a growth rate comparable to that of the expanding power of the federal government itself. A simple statement of the original rule, although outmoded, is
that federal control of interstate commerce and admiralty extends to
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all public navigable lakes and rivers. In re Garnett, 141 U.S. 1
(1891).
The rule in -its present form is clearly outlined in the principal
case in juxtaposition to ,an assertion of a more stable federal prerogative, the taking of water usage without eminent domain proceedings.
It is well established that the United States has a superior navigation
easement which precludes private ownership of the water or its flow
as against the government. United States v. Chandler-DunbarWater
Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913). Therefore, governmental acts which
deprive riparian owners and other parties of the use of the water and
its flow do not constitute seizures of property within the contemplation of the fifth amendment. There being no question of due process,
it follows that the claimant is entitled to no compensation. United
States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956). Although the
result in the case at hand appears to be equitable, the awesome
authority afforded the government by a combination of these two
rules bears little semblance to the scope of the commerce power as
enunciated by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in 1824.
The basic navigable waters rule was established in Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), where the Court held that
navigation is an aspect of commerce, and therefore the federal government has power to regulate navigation and navigable waters. The
expansive nature of the doctrine lies in the successive definitions of
the term "navigable waters."
The Court at first embraced the "English rule," confining federal
jurisdiction to tidal waters, the ebb and flow of the tide constituting
the principal test of navigability. The Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 428 (1825). This test soon proved impractical, for it excluded many important navigable waters. The case was overruled in
The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851), which extended
jurisdiction to the Great Lakes. The principle was later extended
to navigable rivers, The Belfast, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 624 (1869); to
canals, Ex parte Boyer, 109 U.S. 629 (1884); and to other bodies
of water, Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929).
Inevitably, the need arose for a concrete definition of a navigable
stream that could be universally applied to commerce and admiralty
situations. The first such definition was enunciated in The Daniel
Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870), where the Court said:
"Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law
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which are navigable in fact." The case further held that a completely
intrastate waterway, if it unites with other waters to form a continuous
interstate waterway, is within the purview of the commerce clause.
The definition provided in The Daniel Ball, supra, was later
subjected to the erosive effects of qualifications. In Economy Light
Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921), it was held that, when a
body of water is once found to be navigable, the waterway remains
so. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931), held that it is not
necessary for navigability that the use be continuous. Even absence
of use over a period of years does not affect the navigability of streams
in the constitutional sense. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936). It has also been established that 'the
navigability may 'be of a part only of the stream in question. Arizona
v. California, 287 U.S. 423 (1931).
In the next major decision in this area, United States v. AppalachianElec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940), the United States
sought to enjoin the power company from constructing a hydroelectric
dam in the New River in Virginia. The district court held that the
government had no jurisdiction, the river being nonnavigable. The
circuit court affirmed. 107 F. 2d 769 (4th Cir. 1939). The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that a waterway which by -reasonable improvement can be made available for navigation in interstate commerce is a navigable water, and it is not necessary that the improvement shall have 'been already undertaken or completed, nor even
that it shall have been authorized. 311 U.S. at 408.
The next major step was taken in Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v.
Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941), where the government
built a flood control dam on a nonnavigable portion of the Red River
above its navigable stretch. The Court there held that Congress may
control nonnavigable parts of a river in order to preserve and promote
commerce on the navigable parts.
The principle, the growth of which had theretofore been seemingly uninhibited, was limited, however, in the case of United States
v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950), which held that,
even though it be assumed that the federal dam project bears some
relation to control of navigation, if Congress elects to treat it as a
reclamation project, state-created property rights will be recognized,
thus requiring eminent domain proceedings. This holding obstructed
any trend that tended to allow "control of navigation" to be employed
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as a flimsy pretext for establishing broader fields of governmental
activity. Another -modification was provided in United States v.
Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950), where it was held
that the ordinary highwater mark is the limit of the stream bed, and
the navigational servitude does not extend to land beyond the bed
of the river.
No -major pronouncements were found -to change the definitive
color of the rule since the Phillips case, supra. This decision, however, was relied upon rather 'heavily by the Court in reaching its
decision in the principal case, which extended the dootrine from
nonnavigable portions of a navigable stream -to nonnavigable tributaries of a navigable stream.
In the instant decision the Court states that Congress, under the
commerce power, can treat the watersheds as a key to flood control
on navigable streams and their tributaries. 80 S. Ct. at 1136. Whether
this statement is indicative of further liberalization of the rule in
future decisions remains to be seen, but there are other indications
that suggest an ever-broadening concept. The Court discusses a
contention that the navigational servitude of the United States extends
also to all nonnavigable waters, preempting state-created property
rights -in such waters, at least when asserted against the government.
The point is dismissed, however, with the statement that ".... in this
case ...it is not necessary that we reach that contention." 80 S.Ct.
at 1136.
The decisions thus far, appearing to enhance the governmental
purposes of public welfare, manifest broad extensions of -federal
power and collectively indicate a trend toward a culminating rule that
would afford the federal government a prerogative over all the streams
in the country that could be classified as the watershed of a navigable
waterway, without the inhibitions imposed by the fifth amendment.
However extreme or remote this projection might seem, it appears
certain that the final limitations of the navigable stream principle
will ultimately be somewhat broader than those which the courts
presently dare to establish.
Orton Alan Jones
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